Release 1.1.0 — one config file, and a process weight you choose

`project.yaml` at the repo root is now the single source of truth for a
project's configuration, replacing `production/stage.txt`,
`production/review-mode.txt` and `.claude/docs/technical-preferences.md` (all
three still read as a fallback; nothing is force-deleted).

**`modes.rigor` — one question instead of six.** `minimal`, `standard` or
`full` fronts six knobs: `modes.workflow`, `docs.density`, `qa.level`,
`modes.story_granularity`, `modes.review_mode` and `team.size`. It defaults to
`minimal`, which is a change from 1.0's behaviour: the heavier tier was
measured costing several times more to reach working code without producing a
better result, and returning nothing when a fresh developer inherited the
project. Pin `modes.rigor: standard` to keep 1.0's process level.

Also in this release:

- `/settings` to view or change any setting, and `project.local.yaml` for
  per-developer preferences that should not be committed.
- `system_overrides` to hold one system to a higher standard than the rest of
  the project, and `testing.strict` to set per test type whether missing
  evidence blocks a story or warns.
- A story that changes anything the player sees is not closed until the game
  has been launched, observed, and a screenshot retained in
  `production/qa/evidence/`. A parse check is not a run. This holds at every
  rigor level, including `minimal`, where automated tests are waived but the
  look is not.
- The code root is engine-specific and enforced as such: Godot `src/`, Unity
  `Assets/`, Unreal `Source/<Module>/`. Two of the three will not build a
  project laid out any other way.
- Migration tooling for existing projects: `.claude/scripts/migrate-v1-config.sh`
  converts a 1.0 layout, non-destructively by default, with a report to review
  before `--finalize` deletes anything.
- Ask-before-write holds regardless of personal automation settings.

Upgrading from 1.0 or earlier: see UPGRADING.md. Full list of changes:
CHANGELOG.md.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_016xvzG3i7pWQg4LjyDwWMXd
This commit is contained in:
Donchitos
2026-09-23 12:25:11 +10:00
co-authored by Claude Opus 5
parent 984023ddac
commit d05699707f
291 changed files with 24374 additions and 7740 deletions
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@@ -1,13 +1,20 @@
---
name: security-audit
description: "Audit the game for security vulnerabilities: save tampering, cheat vectors, network exploits, data exposure, and input validation gaps. Produces a prioritised security report with remediation guidance. Run before any public release or multiplayer launch."
description: "Security audit — save tampering, cheat vectors, network exploits, data exposure, input validation. Before public or multiplayer release."
argument-hint: "[full | network | save | input | quick]"
user-invocable: true
allowed-tools: Read, Glob, Grep, Bash, Write, Task
allowed-tools: Read, Glob, Grep, Bash, Write, Agent
model: sonnet
agent: security-engineer
---
!`source "${CLAUDE_PROJECT_DIR:-.}/.claude/hooks/yaml-helper.sh" 2>/dev/null && resolve_config --keys automation`
**Automation mode**: Resolve `modes.automation` (`project.local.yaml` →
`project.yaml` → default `collaborative`). Every `AskUserQuestion` call and
every file write follows `.claude/docs/automation-modes.md`
(collaborative asks always · guided major-only · autonomous logs and proceeds;
`automation_always_ask` categories always prompt).
# Security Audit
Security is not optional for any shipped game. Even single-player games have
@@ -36,19 +43,46 @@ remediation plan.
- `quick` — high-severity checks only (fastest, for iterative use)
- No argument — run `full`
Read `.claude/docs/technical-preferences.md` to determine:
- Engine and language (affects which patterns to search for)
- Target platforms (affects which attack surfaces apply)
- Whether multiplayer/networking is in scope
Read `project.yaml` to determine the following, falling back to `.claude/docs/technical-preferences.md` for engine/language/platforms when a key is absent or empty:
- `engine.name` and `engine.language` — **load-bearing: they select the Phase 3
pattern set, and an engine with no sourced set for a category forces
`NOT ASSESSED` for it.** If `engine.name` is absent or empty, say so in the
report and treat every grep category as `NOT ASSESSED`; do not fall back to
the Godot lists because they are the ones written out in full
- `platform.targets` (affects which attack surfaces apply)
- `platform.multiplayer` and `platform.online` — whether multiplayer/networking is
in scope. `technical-preferences.md` has no equivalent fields, so the legacy
fallback cannot supply them.
> **ABSENT DOES NOT MEAN `false`.** These keys have a reader —
> this skill — and **no writer anywhere in the framework**: neither
> `/setup-engine` nor `/start` nor any other skill emits a `platform:` block,
> so on essentially every CCGS project both keys are absent. The previous rule
> here defaulted them to `false`, which meant **Category 2 (Network and
> Multiplayer Security) was skipped on every project including genuinely
> multiplayer ones** — a security category failing open on a value nothing
> sets.
>
> When either key is absent or empty: **do not assume single-player, and do not
> skip Category 2.** Ask the user whether the game has multiplayer or online
> features. If you cannot ask, run Category 2 anyway and mark it
> `NOT ASSESSED — multiplayer scope unconfirmed (platform.multiplayer unset,
> and no skill sets it)`, which makes `CLEAR TO SHIP` unreachable per Phase 5.
> Over-scanning a single-player game costs a few minutes; under-scanning a
> multiplayer one ships the category unrun.
>
> Set them explicitly with `/settings platform.multiplayer=true` (they are
> project-wide, so `--local` is refused). Recording it in `project.yaml` is the
> fix; this rule is the guard for until someone does.
---
## Phase 2: Spawn Security Engineer
Spawn `security-engineer` via Task. Pass:
Spawn `security-engineer` via `Agent`. Pass:
- The audit scope/mode
- Engine and language from technical preferences
- A manifest of all source directories: `src/`, `assets/data/`, any config files
- Engine and language (from `project.yaml`, else technical preferences)
- A manifest of all source directories: the resolved **code root** (per `.claude/docs/code-root-resolution.md`), `assets/data/`, any config files
The security-engineer runs the audit across 6 categories (see Phase 3). Collect their full findings before proceeding.
@@ -58,6 +92,39 @@ The security-engineer runs the audit across 6 categories (see Phase 3). Collect
The security-engineer evaluates each of the following. Skip categories not applicable to the project scope.
### Engine pattern sets — read this before any Category below
**Every pattern list in Categories 1–3 was written for Godot.** On a Unity or
Unreal project they match nothing, and this skill already states what a zero-hit
scan means: it renders the report clean, "the most dangerous possible failure for
a security audit". That warning was earned along the **version** axis
(`File.open` vs `FileAccess`) and the identical hole along the **engine** axis
shipped anyway. Use the table for `engine.name` resolved in Phase 1.
| Category | Godot | Unity | Unreal |
|---|---|---|---|
| 1 — Save / serialization | the Godot list below | **NOT SOURCEABLE** | **NOT SOURCEABLE** |
| 2 — Network / multiplayer | the Godot list below | `ServerRpc`, `ClientRpc`, `NetworkVariable`, `NetworkObject`, `NetworkManager`, `NetworkBehaviour`, `IsServer`, `IsOwner` | `UFUNCTION`, `Server`, `Client`, `NetMulticast`, `Replicated`, `DOREPLIFETIME`, `GetLifetimeReplicatedProps`, `HasAuthority` |
| 3 — Input | the Godot list below | `InputSystem`, `PlayerInput`, `ReadValue`, `InputValue` | `EnhancedInput`, `UInputAction`, `InputMappingContext`, `BindAction`, `FInputActionValue` |
| 4 — Data exposure | engine-agnostic — the list below applies to all three | | |
| 5, 6 | judgement and manifests, not greps — no engine set needed | | |
The Unity and Unreal names above are **sourced from this repo's pinned
references** (`docs/engine-reference/unity/modules/{networking,input}.md`,
`docs/engine-reference/unreal/modules/{networking,input}.md`), not from recall.
Verify them against the pin before use and add what the reference documents that
this table omits — it is a floor, not a complete set.
> **`NOT SOURCEABLE` is a verdict, not a gap to fill from memory.** Neither
> reference tree carries a serialization/save module, so the save-API names for
> Unity and Unreal cannot be confirmed here. **Do not write them from training
> data.** A confidently wrong pattern list is worse in this skill than in any
> other: it produces a scan that looks thorough, finds nothing, and reads as a
> pass. Where the table says NOT SOURCEABLE, that category is **`NOT ASSESSED`**
> for this engine — see Phase 5. To close it properly, add the module to
> `docs/engine-reference/<engine>/` first; then this table can cite it.
### Category 1: Save File and Serialization Security
- Are save files validated before loading? (no blind deserialization)
- Are save file paths constructed from user input? (path traversal risk)
@@ -65,7 +132,22 @@ The security-engineer evaluates each of the following. Skip categories not appli
- Does the game trust numeric values from save files without bounds checking?
- Are there any eval() or dynamic code execution calls near save loading?
Grep patterns: `File.open`, `load`, `deserialize`, `JSON.parse`, `from_json`, `read_file` — check each for validation.
Grep patterns — **check the pinned engine reference before trusting this list**
(see the API-name warning below): `FileAccess`, `File.open`, `open(`, `load`,
`deserialize`, `parse`, `parse_string`, `from_json`, `read_file`, `get_var`,
`bytes_to_var` — check each for validation.
> **API names are version-specific and this list is a starting point, not a
> complete set.** `File.open` is **Godot 3.x**; Godot 4 renamed the class to
> `FileAccess` (`docs/engine-reference/godot/breaking-changes.md`). Before relying
> on these patterns, read `docs/engine-reference/<engine>/` for the version this
> project pins and add the names it documents. A grep for a class that no longer
> exists returns zero hits, and **zero hits in this category renders the report
> clean** — which is the most dangerous possible failure for a security audit.
> Searching only `File.open` against a Godot 4 project finds nothing and reports
> CLEAR TO SHIP on a codebase nobody checked. If you cannot confirm the correct
> names for the pinned version, say so in the report rather than presenting a
> zero-hit scan as a pass.
### Category 2: Network and Multiplayer Security (skip if single-player only)
- Is game state authoritative on the server, or does the client dictate outcomes?
@@ -75,7 +157,14 @@ Grep patterns: `File.open`, `load`, `deserialize`, `JSON.parse`, `from_json`, `r
- Are authentication tokens handled correctly (never sent in plaintext)?
- Does the game expose any debug endpoints in release builds?
Grep for: `recv`, `receive`, `PacketPeer`, `socket`, `NetworkedMultiplayerPeer`, `rpc`, `rpc_id` — check each call site for validation.
Grep for: `recv`, `receive`, `PacketPeer`, `socket`, `MultiplayerPeer`,
`ENetMultiplayerPeer`, `NetworkedMultiplayerPeer`, `rpc`, `rpc_id`,
`@rpc` — check each call site for validation.
> Same version caveat as Category 1. `NetworkedMultiplayerPeer` is **Godot 3.x**;
> Godot 4 uses `ENetMultiplayerPeer`
> (`docs/engine-reference/godot/modules/networking.md`). The bare substring
> `MultiplayerPeer` matches both and is the safer probe.
### Category 3: Input Validation
- Are any player-supplied strings used in file paths? (path traversal)
@@ -86,7 +175,7 @@ Grep for: `recv`, `receive`, `PacketPeer`, `socket`, `NetworkedMultiplayerPeer`,
Grep for: `get_input`, `Input.get_`, `input_map`, user-facing text fields — check validation.
### Category 4: Data Exposure
- Are any API keys, credentials, or secrets hardcoded in `src/` or `assets/`?
- Are any API keys, credentials, or secrets hardcoded in the code root or `assets/`?
- Are debug symbols or verbose error messages included in release builds?
- Does the game log sensitive player data to disk or console?
- Are any internal file paths or system information exposed to players?
@@ -148,7 +237,21 @@ For each finding, assign:
| MEDIUM | [N] | Recommended |
| LOW | [N] | Optional |
**Release recommendation**: [CLEAR TO SHIP / FIX CRITICALS FIRST / DO NOT SHIP]
**Release recommendation**: [NOT ASSESSED — INSUFFICIENT IMPLEMENTATION / CLEAR TO SHIP / FIX CRITICALS FIRST / DO NOT SHIP]
> **`NOT ASSESSED` is required when there was not enough implemented surface to
> audit**, or when the API names for the pinned engine version could not be
> confirmed. A zero-finding scan over two files of source is not a clean bill of
> health, and `CLEAR TO SHIP` must never be reachable by having nothing to look
> at. Name what was missing and which skill produces it.
>
> **The engine axis is part of that rule, not a separate one.** If
> the Phase 3 table marks a category `NOT SOURCEABLE` for this project's
> `engine.name`, that category is `NOT ASSESSED` — state it by name in the
> Executive Summary, and **`CLEAR TO SHIP` is unreachable for the run**. Report
> `NOT ASSESSED — <category> has no sourced pattern set for <engine>` instead.
> A scan that could not look is not a scan that found nothing, and only the
> report can tell the reader which of the two happened.
---